In December 2025, the team of the Center for Security Studies “CENSS”, in cooperation with the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, completed a study analyzing the influence of the Russian Federation and other external actors on Ukraine and the countries of the Western Balkans. The study was carried out as part of the project “Strengthening Resilience to Russian Hybrid Threats through Regional Cooperation: A Joint Initiative of Non-Governmental Organizations in Ukraine and the Western Balkans,” supported by Open Society Foundations Western Balkans and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Kosovo. This publication marks the beginning of a series of materials that will highlight the key findings of the study. The first publication is devoted to the analysis of cultural diplomacy as a component of the Russian Federation’s “soft power” tools.
Cultural diplomacy may be defined as the deliberate and strategic exchange of ideas, values, traditions, and other cultural elements to foster mutual understanding, strengthen relationships, advance socio-cultural cooperation, and promote national or international interests. Governmental bodies or other private entities may conduct it, each contributing to the broader objective of building trust and dialogue across cultural divides.30
Russia utilizes cultural diplomacy as a strategic tool to exert political influence over the internal affairs of targeted states, thereby affecting their governmental structures and public institutions. We consider cultural diplomacy to be a part of soft-power strategy that is used in combination with other types of state power. “Soft” power is the ability to influence the actions, behavior, or value paradigms of others indirectly, without using coercion or material incentives, due to other types of motivation.
Russia has developed a concept widely known as the “Russian world.” One dimension of this concept aims to establish a foundation for interference, intervention, or invasion in other countries based on historical and cultural conditions. The concept of the “Russian world” encompasses various components, including culture, subculture, and history. The “Russian world” is presented as a cultural and civilizational space that transcends the territorial boundaries of present-day Russia. Adherents of this theory generally believe that Russia’s contribution to world culture is being deliberately downplayed. Russia, in the mind of its president, is not just a country but a civilization.31 In his worldview, the special position and features of the Russian state stem from this model of state-civilization. The core inaugural elements of the Russian state-civilization are a single nation; a single state (former); a single language; a single religion (dominant at the state level), and a single culture.
A number of institutions of so-called cultural diplomacy have been created in Russia to promote this concept of the “Russian world” (Rossotrudnichestvo, the Institute of Compatriots, the Russian World Foundation). Thus, Rossotrudnichestvo is a federal agency under the Russian MFA whose main mission is to “strengthen Russia’s humanitarian influence in the world.” With an institutional heritage dating back to 1925, the organization has a presence in 71 countries worldwide (including Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria) through 87 foreign missions. Since 2021, it has been informally known as the “Russian House.”32 Such offices often operate under the umbrella of Russian embassies or consulates and even share the same building, making it difficult to control their activities. It is worth noting that according to Regulations, outside the RF, Rossotrudnichestvo, in agreement with the MFA, carries out its functions through Rossotrudnichestvo representative offices, Russian centers for science and culture abroad, Russian information and cultural centers abroad, Russian houses of science and culture abroad, Russian cultural centers abroad and their branches, or through its representatives within the diplomatic missions of the Russian Federation.33
Education is one of its core instruments, with thousands of scholarships provided annually to foreign students for study at more than 400 Russian universities. In 2024, about 20,000 programs at 433 Russian universities were opened to foreign students. The agency coordinates the work of its representative offices and diplomatic institutions in selecting foreign citizens, stateless persons, and compatriots living abroad for further studies at Russian universities under the government’s 30,000-person quota. The number of young people from other countries willing to study in Russia free of charge increased from 54,000 to 77,000 in 2024. Rossotrudnichestvo’s representative offices not only work actively with foreign applicants but also maintain broad interaction with international alumni, whose total number exceeds 500,000.34 Alongside this, the agency promotes the Russian language through dedicated centers, courses, and even mobile “Russian schools.”
Cultural outreach is another key element, including the organization of international events such as film screenings, book fairs, exhibitions, conferences, and the so-called “Russia Day”.35 Youth-oriented initiatives also play a crucial role, with programs such as New Generation and the Sochi World Youth Festival designed to engage young leaders abroad. Over the last 10 years, the total number of participating countries in the “New Generation” program reached 153, and the number of participants exceeded 10,000 (in 2024, there were 900 participants from 66 countries).36
Rossotrudnichestvo also works extensively with diaspora communities, positioning its efforts as protecting the rights of “compatriots abroad” and preserving their cultural identity. In addition, it actively uses media and information platforms—social media accounts, websites, and TV and radio projects—to broadcast Russian narratives internationally.37
In Ukraine, Rossotrudnichestvo offices were active in Kyiv, Odesa, and Sevastopol. In 2018, the SBU uncovered anti-Ukrainian activities by Rossotrudnichestvo staff at the Russian Consulate General in Odesa, including cooperation with pro-Russian civic groups under the guise of “Humanitarian and Social Programmes.” One consulate employee, proven to have ties to Russian security services, was declared
persona non grata. The process of banning Rossotrudnichestvo in Ukraine required repealing the bilateral agreement on cultural centers. In April 2021, Presidential Decree No.140/2021 introduced sanctions that effectively terminated Rossotrudnichestvo’s operations for three years. The decision followed a controversial event in Kyiv in March 2021 at the Russian Centre of Science and Culture, which attempted to appropriate the legacy of Taras Shevchenko. Despite the ban, on November 30, 2021, Russia opened a “Russian House” in occupied Donetsk.38
Based on the research of the Ukrainian Institute39 we compared the tools of Rossotrudnichestvo used in Ukraine (before and after aggression) and Serbia.
| Category | Serbia | Ukraine |
| Infrastructure | Russian House in Belgrade (opened 1933, the largest in Europe) | In 2008, the Russian Centre of Science and Culture opened in Kyiv, and the one in Simferopol opened in 2012 and closed in 2014. Another representative office was at the General Consulate of Russia in Odesa. The Russian Center for Science and Culture (RCSC) in Kyiv operated actively until 2014. Used as a base for cultural and educational events, outreach to Russian-speaking communities. After Crimea’s annexation in 2014, Ukrainian authorities suspended their work. In 2018, the Kyiv City Council officially terminated the lease and banned further activities. |
| Education | Russian language courses with ~1,500 students yearly | Before 2014: Russian language promotion, scholarships for Ukrainian students to study in Russia, summer schools, and youth exchanges. Focus on “compatriots abroad.” After 2014: programs dismantled, scholarships seen as recruitment and influence tools. |
| Cultural Events | Dozens of events yearly: book fairs, photo exhibitions, music festivals | Before 2014: Russian cultural festivals, Victory Day events, book exhibitions, film screenings. Between 2014–2022: public events curtailed, most activities went underground or shifted to online propaganda. |
| Memory Politics | Heavy emphasis on WWII memory and ties with Serbian Orthodox Church | Before 2014: Soviet/WWII commemoration central to activities, framed around “shared victory.” After 2014: seen as a tool of political manipulation (narratives of “fascism” in Ukraine). Activities banned after Kyiv accused Rossotrudnichestvo of spreading separatist ideas. |
| Youth Programs | Cooperation with local NGOs and youth initiatives | Before 2014: summer camps, exchanges, youth forums funded by Russia, targeting young Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Between 2014–2022: activities stopped; Ukrainian authorities warned of attempts to recruit students and activists. |
| Diaspora Work | Links with pro-Russian NGOs, journalists, Orthodox Church | Before 2014: focus on Russian-speaking Ukrainians as “compatriots,” organizing forums, “Russian language days,” and support for diaspora organizations. After 2014: considered a cover for political interference and support for pro-Russian groups in Donbas and Crimea |
| Media / Info Tools | Russian House as media hub; narratives echoed by pro-Russian outlets |
Before 2014: cultural magazines, local partnerships, joint media projects with Russian TV. After 2014, the Ukrainian government accused the RCSC of being part of Kremlin disinformation; by 2018, the center was legally closed and all activities outlawed. |
The Russkiy Mir Foundation is another Russian institution in the field of cultural diplomacy. It is a Russian government-sponsored organization established in 2007 by a decree from President Vladimir Putin. Its official purpose is to promote the Russian language and culture globally, support Russian language teaching programs, and strengthen Russia’s influence in the world. The foundation aims to reconnect the Russian diaspora with their homeland and engage with anyone who has an interest in the Russian language and culture. It achieves this by creating “Russian Centers” abroad, which serve as hubs for cultural and educational activities. These centers offer language courses, organize cultural events, provide access to informational resources, and host conferences and meetings to foster communication and a sense of shared community. The foundation’s work has been described by some observers as a tool of Russian soft power and propaganda, aiming to promote a pro-Russian perspective and traditional values while also serving to legitimize Russian foreign policy.40
The foundation is very active in the Balkans (especially in Bulgaria and Serbia). In Serbia, the activities of the Russkiy Mir are concentrated in 2 offices in Novi Sad and Belgrade. The organization and its partners in Serbia are dedicated to promoting Russian culture, language, and historical heritage. These efforts are not simply one-off events but rather a consistent and multifaceted campaign to strengthen the cultural, social, and political bond between Russia and Serbia.41 Several key political statements and events that demonstrate mutual support can be found on the organization’s website. For instance, a banner thanking Russian President Vladimir Putin was unfurled in front of the Serbian parliament.42 The Serbian Interior Minister, Aleksandar Vulin, stated that Serbia would not join the “anti-Russian hysteria” sweeping Western countries and would maintain its status as an ally.43 Polling data cited in the text indicates that an overwhelming majority of Serbians oppose antiRussian sanctions, and more than 70% of Serbs surveyed believe Russia was forced to launch a “special operation” to prevent NATO expansion.44 A banner in Novi Sad, Serbia, read, “EU, go home, Serbia and Russia – this is our union.”45
The main thrust of the activities is cultural. This includes a variety of festivals and exhibitions, such as Russian Film Festivals, Hermitage Days, and exhibits showcasing Russian art and photography.46 Events also include forums like the Russian-Serbian Cultural Forum,47 concerts of Russian music, and celebrations of Russian culture.48 ian culture.49 A core part of the educational activities involves promoting the Russian language. This is done through free language courses for both adults and children
in various cities, as well as the establishment of “Open Education Centers.” The organization also hosts congresses for Russian language teachers to support the educational community.50
A significant number of activities are dedicated to historical commemoration. This includes ceremonies and exhibitions honoring shared historical events, such as the liberation of Belgrade from the Nazis and the Battle of Stalingrad. For example, at the international conference “Antifascism — a Permanent Duty”
in Pančevo, Serbia, organizations, experts, and politicians from Russia, Serbia, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia promoted narratives on preserving the historical memory of World War II, illustrating how Moscow uses commemorative events abroad to project influence and reinforce its ideological presence in Europe. There are also efforts to immortalize figures important to Russian-Serbian history, with monuments and plaques dedicated to Russian emigrants, soldiers, and historical figures like Tsar Nicholas II 51 and the Soviet linguist Nikita Tolstoy.52
Russia utilizes Serbia as а key country for international events for compatriots in Europe. Thus, the 18th Regional Conference of Russian Compatriots in Europe and North America was held in Belgrade, bringing together participants from 37 countries. They discussed the topic “Historical and cultural heritage as a guarantee of preserving the unity of Russian compatriots abroad.”53 The organization actively works to build and maintain a strong community among Russian compatriots in Serbia. This is evident in events such as regional conferences for compatriots, patriotic motor rallies,54 and various social gatherings hosted at the “Russian House” in Belgrade.55 These activities serve to create a sense of shared identity and purpose and increase Russia’s soft influence in the region.
30 See: Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, https://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_culturaldiplomacy
31 TASS (17 maj 2020). Putin: The future of Russian civilization depends on success in the development of high technologies. https://nauka.tass.ru/nauka/8493647
32 See: https://rs.gov.ru/en/about-foiv
33 REGULATIONS on the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1315 of September 6, 2008 . https://rs.gov.ru/app/uploads/2023/04/polozhenie-o-rossotrudnichestve.pdf
34 Official report of Rossotrudnichestvo of 2024. https://rs.gov.ru/app/uploads/2025/07/183cfe_
rossotrudnichestvo_2024.pdf
35 See: https://tass.ru/politika/24205727; https://bigasia.ru/den-rossii-otmetili-v-russkih-domah-po-vsej-azii
36 Official report of Rossotrudnichestvo of 2024. https://rs.gov.ru/app/uploads/2025/07/183cfe_rossotrudnichestvo_2024.pdf
37 See: https://ui.org.ua/sectors/rossotrudnichestvo-theunbearable-harshness-of-soft-power/
38 See: https://ui.org.ua/sectors/rossotrudnichestvo-theunbearable-harshness-of-soft-power/
39 State agency under the MFA of Ukraine.
40 Russkiymir, see: Shih: https://russkiymir.ru/
41 Russkiymir, see:: https://russkiymir.ru/en/news/?arrFilter_DATE_CREATE_1&arrFilter_DATE_CREATE_2=&arrFilter_pf%5Bcountry%5D%5B0%5D=1469&set_filter=Y; https://russkiymir.ru/news/?arrFilter_DATE_CREATE_1=&arrFilter_DATE_CREATE_2=&arrFilter_pf%5Brazdel%5D%5B0%5D=&arrFilter_pf%5Bcountry%5D%5B0%5D=969&set_filter=Y&PAGEN_1=4
42 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/en/news/305806
43 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/329621
44 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/303505
45 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/302857
46 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/334090
47 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/331109
48 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/?arrFilter_DATE_CREATE_1=&arrFilter_DATE_CREATE_2=&arrFilter_pf%5Brazdel%5D%5B0%5D=&arrFilter_pf%5Bcountry%5D%5B0%5D=969&set_filter=Y&PAGEN_1=4
49 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/334554
50 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/332237
51 Russkiymir, see: https://ruskidom.rs/2025/07/18/vrusskom-dome-v-belgrade-proshlo-eroprijatie-v-pamjato-carskoj-seme-romanovyh
52 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/publications/322075
53 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/336415
54 Russkiymir, see: https://russkiymir.ru/news/287763 ; https://russkiymir.ru/news/314468
55 Russkiymir, see: https://ruskidom.rs/2025/07/01/russko-serbskij-vecher-v-masterskoj-upravlenija-senezh ; https://ruskidom.rs/2025/06/17/v-russkom-dome-vbelgrade-sostojalas-vstrecha-so-studentami-rusistami ; https://ruskidom.rs/2025/06/09/v-russkom-dome-vbelgrade-sostojalsja-vecher-pojezii-posvjashhennyjbratstvu-serbov-i-russkih; https://ruskidom.rs/2025/03/28/
zhenshhiny-russkoj-jemigracii-v-serbii
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