Российская военная мощь – возможно ли сдерживание

Опубликовано информационным агентством “Интерфакс-Украина” 13 ноября 2020 года.

Политика сдерживания, в общем смысле, состоит в том, чтобы разубедить, заставить отказаться от применения военной силы государство[1], рассматривающее такую возможность.

Сдерживание, по своей сути, является своего рода встречной угрозой на угрозу применения военной силы.

Государство может отказаться от идеи применить силу в том случае, если вероятные негативные последствия для него будут сопоставимы с потенциальными выгодами или даже превышать их. Детальніше

Вадим Черниш ефірі телеканалу «Україна-24»: ефективного контролю за порушенням домовленостей про припинення вогню поки немає.

Чи дотримуватимуться обидві сторони домовленостей про повне припинення вогню на Сході України? Хто і як це контролюватиме? Хто контролюватиме зону розмежування після розведення військ? Чи допоможе міжнародний миротворчий контингент врегулювати ситуацію на лінії розмежування? Про це Вадим Черниш, ексміністр з питань тимчасово окупованих територій та внутрішньо переміщених осіб України, голова Керівної Ради Центру “СЕНСС” говорив в ефірі програми «Реальна політика з Євгеном Кисельовим» на каналі Україна-24. Детальніше

Вадим Черниш: Загроза з боку Росії не зменшилась

Загроза з боку Росії не зменшилась, а українцям треба обережніше їздити до дружніх до РФ країн. Про це Вадим Черниш, ексміністр з питань тимчасово окупованих територій та внутрішньо переміщених осіб України, голова Керівної Ради Центру “СЕНСС” сказав в ефірі телеканалу «Прямий».


Вадим Черниш пояснив, чому США не надають дані з супутнику про збиття РФ літака рейсу МН17

Ексміністр з питань тимчасово окупованих територій та внутрішньо переміщених осіб України, голова Керівної Ради Центру “СЕНСС” Вадим Черниш в ефірі телеканалу «Прямий» пояснив, чому США відмовились розсекречувати і надавати супутникові дані про запуск ракети по літаку MH17.


Vadym Chernysh on the issues of Ukrainian language in ORDLO, Russian passports and water supply in Crimea

Strategy of Russia to separate certain occupied areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (ORDLO) from Ukraine comprises unified state Russian language in ORDLO, no charges to obtain Russian passport and a simplified issue regime of such passports to residents of the occupied territories, and license plates with ORDLO registration. Vadym Chernysh elaborated on the issues on the air of the talk show “Echo Ukrainy” by Matvii Hanapolskyi on the channel “Priamyi”.


 How Ukraine should counteract to the issuance of Russian passports on the occupied territories.

“The Russian Federation motivates the issuance of passports by alleged humanitarian needs, which was even outlined in the relevant decree of the President of the Russian Federation on a simplified procedure for the issuance of Russian passports. However, this mechanism is more of a political nature, inter alia, elections, protection, integration into information space, labor force, services. In 2019, when I headed the Ministry of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, we had an initiative on non-recognition of passports issued by the Russian Federation to residents of the occupied territories of Donbas, both domestic and foreign. This was the basic position of Ukraine and by diplomacy we had to work out the appropriate measures for non-recognition of such passports with each country. There was a statement of some Baltic countries that they would agree to such a step, there was a statement by the EU that they would consider this possibility. This issue needs to be developed so that this passport would have no value. From domestic to foreign,” said Vadym Chernysh.


On sanctions for the Russian passports issuing authorities.

“We also proposed to introduce personal sanctions against those who organized the process of issuing passports in the occupied Donbas. In order for these people, who are involved in the passportization of the residents of non-Government controlled territories due to the occupation, should be subject to international sanctions. Among these individuals that we have proposed are the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and officials of the Russian authorities in top-down command structure who are personally responsible for issuing Russian passports, including even those sitting in passport offices in Rostov oblast.”


On Russian passports of the leadership of the so-called republics

“Recent events clearly show that representatives of the Russian occupation administrations have been issued with Russian passports. But let’s remember that Oleksandr Borodai had a passport of a Russian citizen, the so-called Prime Minister of  “DPR” is a Russian citizen, also he is the First Deputy Governor of Irkutsk oblast. The Minister of State Security in Luhansk oblast is a staff member of the Federal Security Service. He just works under another name in the occupied part of Luhansk oblast. All this is evidence that all processes in the ORDLO are guided and organized directly from Russia by its citizens.”


On water supply to Crimea.

“There are several things that are not clear to me. For example, one or more deputies from the political party “Servant of the People” come out and say: we may now think about supplying water to the Crimea. And I ask: Who did ask you to do that? There was no official request. No one did. Why did you jump to the conclusion that water is needed there?” asks Vadym Chernysh.

“According to our calculations, there is no need for water for humanitarian needs. Only for technical, economic needs. There is drinking water, that’s enough. There is enough for humanitarian needs. I have another question: What water is used now? From the Ukrainian captured subsoil! And whose gas do they use? From the Black Sea coast. For example, in Northern Cyprus, Turkey (which once made a military invasion there) a pipeline under water was built. In general, now the occupation authorities in Crimea use a lot of water instead of providing the population with drinking water for the needs of the chemical industry, for chemical production, which are harmful for the most Crimeans, there is an irrational use of water resources.”


On the Strategy for the return of Donbas and Crimea.

I have heard that the Strategy has to be developed by the end of the year. An official document shall be approved, where we could see this Strategy, however it is still missing. I emphasize that according to the legislation, the National Security Strategy had to be adopted as early as November 2019, and it is still missing, although it is a basic document. That is as I cannot understand how three strategies for National Security, on the return of Crimea and Donbas can exist separately from each other.


See the full version of the conversation here: