On September 25-26, the city of Priština (Kosovo) hosted the next summit on peace and democracy, titled “Radical Realities: Ethnopolitical Dynamics and Euro-Atlantic Integration in the Western Balkans.” The event brought together over 160 civil society leaders, politicians, and experts from the region and the European Union.
At the invitation of the CENSS partner – the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies – Viktoria Voronina, Executive Director of CENSS, participated in the summit. She was a speaker at the panel “Western Balkans and Geopolitical Rivalry: Countering Russian and Chinese Influence,” which was supported by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
The discussion covered the strategic interests of Russia and China in the region, the methods and channels through which they exert their influence, and the consequences for regional stability and security. Panelists explored the economic, political, and social dimensions of this influence, including investments in infrastructure, political alliances, and cultural exchanges, as well as assessing the potential risks associated with this geopolitical rivalry, such as increased political polarization, economic dependence, and the erosion of democratic institutions and norms in the Western Balkans.
Viktoria Voronina’s speech primarily focused on concrete examples of how Russia carries out its interventions in various countries. She highlighted that the methods and tools used are similar, regardless of the country or region.
Starting her speech, Viktoria Voronina emphasized that the main driver behind Russia’s actions to establish and strengthen its influence in any given country is security considerations. “Their primary goal is to create ‘grey zones’ and ‘hot spots in Europe’ for control and destabilization,” she noted. Russian representatives are often former intelligence officers or security services agents, infiltrated into various organizations and institutions, through which they influence different processes. These individuals can always claim “this is not Russia,” adhering to the concept of “plausible deniability.”
The speaker also pointed out the need to differentiate between the concepts of “propaganda” and “disinformation.” She explained: “When we talk about disinformation, we mean false information. But propaganda is different – it involves creating narratives for different situations and framing various circumstances in a way that suits the desired agenda. Russia uses both tools in an attempt to destabilize the situation in Europe,” she emphasized.
Sharing Ukraine’s experience, Viktoria Voronina noted that over the past two decades, Ukraine has become a testing ground for all possible non-military tools of Russian influence across various spheres – information, economic, and political. She pointed out that Russia employs similar tools not only in Ukraine but also in all the countries it seeks to destabilize. Russia’s concept of external intervention is based on five components: a unified nation, a unified religion, a unified language, a unified or familiar culture, and a unified state (or former state).
Discussing the concept of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), which is based on three components – culture, subculture, and history – Viktoria Voronina provided an example: “In Russia, there is a movement called the ‘Night Wolves’ (a pro-Kremlin biker group). They have visited Serbia and the Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina) several times. Recently, they posted on their Telegram channel that Kosovo is like the Battle of Borodino during the 19th-century war. In other words, they are promoting the narrative that Serbia and Russia share a common history.”
Regarding disinformation, the speaker pointed out that a media school was recently established in Serbia, founded by one of Russia’s military correspondents in the war in Ukraine, who runs a Russian propaganda Telegram channel called “Rybary” (The Fishermen). “He is very effective at spreading Russian disinformation and propaganda, justifying Russian military aggression, and networking through Telegram channels. So, we can imagine what might happen next if such a media school continues to operate in Serbia,” she warned.
Continuing her speech, Viktoria Voronina provided several examples of Russia’s creeping intervention in Serbia, including the activities of Russian media outlets in the country, which broadcast content about Serbia in Russian. “But why? Can we imagine that ordinary Russians care about the situation in Serbia? I think not,” she said. In 2019, Russians collaborated with Serbia to produce a film about the war in Kosovo. Another example is the Russian rock band *Kipelov*, which performed in Serbia. The band has a song titled “Kosovo Field,” which they first presented in 2015 and later performed in Serbia in 2021, with Serbian subtitles. “So, we essentially see this as a justification for external intervention. Russia has been preparing its population for a long time to ask, ‘What is Ukraine? Whose land is Ukraine? What is Russia’s interest in Ukraine?’ A similar situation can now be observed in the Western Balkans. For Russia, this is a grey zone between NATO/EU and a ‘hot spot’ that can be used to destabilize the situation in Europe,” the speaker concluded.
Another strong tool of Russia’s influence in other countries is *Rossotrudnichestvo* (the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation). It operates in 80 countries and has 96 offices worldwide. This organization has a solid network of partner organizations and works closely with “compatriots.” The role of churches, certain religious groups, and non-governmental organizations is also crucial. “For example, during the 2010 elections in Ukraine, Russia controlled a vast network of civil organizations, including Cossack groups and some cultural organizations, which covered all their manipulations, as well as propaganda and disinformation activities. This network had a clear system of subordination, coordination, extensive funding, and a secretariat,” the speaker explained.
Another example involves the Muslim population of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars, who were affected by Russia’s occupation. Some left the territory and relocated to Ukrainian-controlled areas, while others stayed behind. Some imams who supported Ukraine also left Crimea after the occupation. Russia, however, built new mosques and brought in new imams and religious leaders. “Russia is very flexible in its methods and tactics, and its institutions can use various levers to influence other countries,” Voronina noted.
In conclusion, the Executive Director of CENSS emphasized that Ukraine’s experience will be very useful in countering Russia’s subversive influence, as despite the different regions or countries where Russia carries out its interventions, the aggressor state consistently uses similar or even identical methods and tools.
